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A SURROGATE CONTRACT AND ITS ENFORCEABILITY
UNDER OHIO LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law has always been challenged to keep up with advances in
medical science. 1 One of the most recent and unprecedented challenges
is surrogate motherhood. This process, in which a -woman is artificially
inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband pursuant to
contract, is seen by some as "reproductive prostitution," 2 while others
see it as a way for hundreds of couples to realize the miracle of a
baby.' Surrogate motherhood is fraught with issues, many of which the
legal community has yet to answer.4 However, a New Jersey couple
who has recently asked a New Jersey family court to determine the
contractual and custodial rights of the parties to a surrogate agreement
may force the legal community to provide some answers. The case in
New Jersey is the first of its kind to raise these contractual issues in a
foundation for
courtroom 6 and may prove to be significant in laying the
7
motherhood.
surrogate
of
practice
law governing the
Since the threshold issue of any dispute arising under a contract is
the validity of that contract, this comment will focus on the validity
and enforceability of a surrogate contract under current Ohio law in
the context of the issues that arise when the contract is breached. This
comment will also discuss the remedies available to the parties.
II.
A.

THE LAW TO DATE

The Process of Surrogate Motherhood
Surrogate mothering is a service generally sought by married
I. Gersz, The Contract in Surrogate Motherhood: A Review of the Issues, 12 L.
107 (1984).

MED. &

HEALTH'CARE

2. Galen, Surrogate Law, NAT. L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 8, col. 4.
3. Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in Ohio: A Dangerous Game of Baby Roulette, 15
CAP. U.L. REV. 93, 93 (1985).
4. "'This is as explosive as the nuclear holocaust,' says Dr. Densen-Gerber. 'By splitting the
atom we created a whole lot of issues. By creating life, we are creating a whole other set of
issues.'" Galen, supra note 2, at 8, col.l.
5. In re Baby M., No. FM-25314-83E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 31, 1987).
6. See Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 245-46
(1984).
7. Gary Skoloff, attorney for the Sterns in In re Baby M. stated, "If this contract is not
upheld, it will be the end, of all surrogate mother programs in the nation. Who is going to take the
chance that the surrogate will changel her mind at the last minute?" Toolen, Surrogate Mom
Vows Fight to Recover Seized Baby, The Record, Aug. 3, 1986, at I.
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couples who are incapable of having children.' The husband has a normal sperm count; however, the wife, 9 for various medical reasons, is
either incapable of conceiving or unable to carry a child to term." In
order that the couple may have a child who is biologically related to at
least its father, a surrogate mother" is artificially inseminated with the
semen of the husband. 2 This procedure is performed pursuant to a
contract 8 which provides that the surrogate, in consideration for substantial fee, will carry the baby to term, at which time she will give the
child to the natural father.14 His wife then has the option to adopt the
child.'
B.

The Evolution of Surrogate Mothering

The practice of surrogate motherhood dates back to biblical
times. 6 Barren wives would send their husbands to their "handmaids"
so that the husband could have children of his own body.' The use of
concubines1 8 was prevalent throughout history at times when there was
a strong economic need for children as a source of domestic or trade
labor.' 9 Additionally, concubines enabled a man to carry on his legacy

8. See Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 374
(1981); Handel & Sherwyn, Surrogate Parenting: Coming to Grips with the Future, 18 TRIAL 57
(1982); Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147 (1980).
Surrogate mothering may also be contemplated by other people such as single women, homosexuals, or married women with careers who do not wish to be pregnant but still want children.
See generally Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COL. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1
(1986). For purposes of this comment, only married couples incapable of having children will be
discussed.
9. The "husband" of the infertile couple, for purposes of this comment, will be referred to
as either the "natural" or "biological" father. The infertile wife will be referred to as the wife of
the "natural" or "biological" father.
10. For other reasons why surrogates have been employed, see Katz, supra note 8, at p.3,
n.8.
II. Most services which match couples with surrogates have an in depth physiological and
psychological screening program for both the couple and the surrogate. In addition, these services
usually require that the surrogate have at least one child so that she understands the emotional
and medical ramifications of her services. See Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a
Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 265, 275-77 (1983).
12. Cohen, supra note 6, at 243.
13. For the Surrogate contract used in In re Baby M., see Appendix.
14. See Brophy, supra note 11, at 270-74.
15. Id. at 264.
16. See 2 Samuel 3:2-5; 1 Kings 11:3; 2 Chronicls 11:21.
17. Abraham's wife, Sarah, was unable to conceive; she sent her husband to her maid, Hagar, so that she could bear a child for them. Genesis 16.
18. The term "concubine" as used in the Bible signified a wife of the second rank who was

inferior to the matron or mistress of the house. A.

CRUNDEN,

HOLY SCRIPrURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT

A

COMPLETE CONCORDANCE TO THE

161 (_).

19. L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS 2 (1985).The court in In re Baby M, No. FM-2531486E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 31, 1987), recognized the social and psychological importance attached to having children who are genetically related to them to reproduce bloodlines and
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despite his wife's infertility.
Today, the reasons and the methods are different, but still the
need for "concubines" exists in the form of surrogate mothers. Most
married couples desire to have children to love and nurture; yet, this
aspiration is often unfulfilled for the one in seven couples found to be
infertile. 0 This inability to bear children has become even more of a
problem for medical science in recent years as adoption, the usual alternative for such couples has become increasingly more difficult. 1
Even the adoptions which are successful may require a waiting period
of up to seven years.2 Moreover, "[t]he legalization of abortion, the
development and widespread use of reliable contraceptives, and the
changing morality with respect to raising 'illegitimate' children has led
to a significant drop in the number of infants available for adoption.""
The modern practice of surrogate motherhood eliminates the adulterous nature of procreation through the use of concubines because fertilization of the surrogate is achieved through artificial insemination.
The child born as a result of the artificial insemination is not the product of an adulterous relationship since there has been no sexual intercourse.24 However, the evolution of surrogate motherhood from adulterous practices has tainted it with moral and ethical questions2 5 which,
among other considerations, tend to cloud an objective determination of
the legal issues involved in this practice.2"
C. State of the Law in General
The existing statutory law, which is completely silent as to the regulation of surrogate contracts, contains a number of inequities which
may impede an expeditious resolution of conflicts arising out of a surrogate arrangement. Recently, bills have been proposed in several states
which take varying approaches to the practice. These bills range from

to connect to future generations through one's genes. Id.
20. L. ANDREWS, supra, note 19. An estimated 10% to 15% of all married couples are
involuntarily childless. It is estimated that between five hundred thousand and one million married
women are unable to have a child related to them genetically or gestationally without some kind
of assisted fertilization or uterine implant. See In re Baby M., FM-25314-86E (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. March 31, 1987).
21. See N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 14 (1981).
22. Gersz, supra note I.
23. See Keane, supra note 8, at 150-51.
24. "[S]ince the abrogation of polygamy by our Lord Jesus Christ, and the reduction of
marriage to its primitive institution, the abuse of concubines has been condemned and forbidden
among Christians." CRUNDEN, supra note 18, at 161.
25. See Galen, supra note 2. Because surrogate parenting has only recently come into public focus, the legal issues for issues raised neither existed nor were they anticipated prior to the
late 1970's. Handel & Sterwyn, supra note 8, at 57.
26. See Katz, supra note 8, at 45-51.
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those which merely provide a general framework through which surrogate contracts would be implemented2 7 to bills which would regulate
the entire process of surrogate motherhood. 8 Alaska, for example, has
proposed legislation which contains only three general provisions: (1) it
allows unlimited compensation to the surrogate; (2) it presumes that
the biological father of the child is the man whose sperm was used to
artificially inseminate the surrogate; and (3) it automatically terminates the rights of the surrogate mother to the child immediately upon
birth. 9 New Jersey, on the other hand, has proposed legislation30 which
provides a comprehensive framework for the surrogate arrangement, 1
obligates the parties to various standards of conduct,32 and provides
remedies for breach of contract.3
To date only Kentucky, Michigan, and New Jersey courts have
grappled with the issue of surrogate motherhood. 4 However, neither
Kentucky nor Michigan have decided issues relating to the validity of a
specific contract or to the custodial rights of the parties. In Surrogate
ParentingAssociates Inc. v. Kentucky 3 5 the Kentucky Attorney General brought suit against the Surrogate Parenting Associates (SPA) alleging in part that SPA's practices were in violation of several Kentucky statutes dealing with the sale of children for adoption purposes.3
In its opinion, the court noted the similarity between in vitro fertilization,3 7 which the Kentucky legislature insulated from attack by babybartering laws,3 8 and surrogate parenting procedures.3 9 The court held

27. See, e.g., Alaska H.R. 498, 12th Leg., 1st Sess. (1981); R.1. Assembly 83-H6132, Jan.
Sess. (1983).
28. See, e.g., N.J. 5481 (1983) (reintroduced as N.J. S767 (1986); Cal. Assembly 3771,
Reg. Sess. (1982).
29. Alaska H.R. 498, 12th Leg., Ist Sess.
30. N.J. S481 (reintroduced as N.J. S767).
31. See id. at §§ 3-10.
32. See, e.g., id. at §§ 4(a), (b), (h).
33. See Id. § 4(g), 13-15. The proposed bill requires that the surrogate agreement itself
shall provide for "[tihe availability of all legal and equitable remedies in the event of a breach of
the surrogate parenthood contract by any of the parties." Id. § 4(g). The bill also contains a
damages provision allowing courts to use "any legal and equitable relief it deems appropriate
including specific performance." Id. § 14.
34. See In re Baby M., slip op. at 1; Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438
(1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983); Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704
S.W.2d. (Ky. 1986).
35. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
36. Id. at 210 (for purposes of analysis, the court accepted a stipulation of facts regarding
SPA's procedures for surrogate arrangements).
37. This procedure is generally performed by taking an egg from another woman, fertilizing
it with the husband's sperm and implanting it in the wife's uterus. Surrogate Parenting, 704
S.W.2d at 212 n.3.
38. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1985).
Baby-bartering is a generic term used to describe laws which prohibit payment in connection
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that the SPA's practices were not illegal' recognizing that "the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart. . . of
constitutionally protected choices."" Accordingly, the court held that
the statutorily proscribed restrictions on payment for adoptions were
inapplicable to contractually arranged surrogate motherhood. "2
The court delved further into the issues involved in surrogate
agreements and in dicta stated that, according to Kentucky law, "3 the
surrogate is "free to change her mind"" as to whether she wishes to
terminate her parental rights to the child.' 5 Once the Kentucky court
made a determination that the surrogate may renege on her contractual
obligations, the implication arose that the policies embodied in Kentucky's adoption statutes' 6 take precedence over the parties' contractual
commitments.'" Under Kentucky law, the rights of the biological father
and the surrogate mother would be determined according to custody
statutes.'8
In an earlier decision a Michigan court of appeals reached conclusions differing from those of the court in Surrogate Parenting.49 In a
declaratory action by a married couple wishing to enter into a surrogate contract with the husband's secretary paying her for her services,5 0
the Michigan court of appeals was asked to adjudge unconstitutional
the sections of the Michigan Adoption Code which prohibit payment
for adoption related proceedings."' In refusing to grant the couple's request, the court held that under Michigan law the couple was not pre-

with adoption. See Katz, supra note 8.
39. "Donor 'invitro fertilization' differs from SPA's procedure only in who carries the fertilized egg. Donor 'invitro fertilization' and 'surrogate parenting' are virtually indistinguishable from
the standpoint of biological engineering." Surrogate Parenting,704 S.W.2d at 212 n.3.
40. Id. at 213-14 (leaving it to the legislature to determine the procedure of SPA is to be
adjudged illegal).
41. Id. at 212 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
42. Id. at 213. The court noted that should a surrogate choose not to terminate her parental
relationship with the child, then she would forfeit her rights to whatever fees she may have been
entitled to under the contract. Id.
43. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500(5) (1987) (prohibiting the mother from giving consent for
adoption prior to five days after birth); id. §199.601(2) (prohibiting the filing for voluntay termination of parental rights prior to five days after birth).
44. Surrogate Parenting, 704 S.W.2d at 213.
45. "The policy of the voluntary termination statute and the consent to adoption statute is
to preserve to the mother her right of choice regardless of decisions made before the birth of the
child." Id.
46. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 199.500(5), 199.601(2).
47. Surrogate Parenting, 704 S.W.2d at 213.
48. Id. See also Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.270.
49. Doe. v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1183 (1983).
50. Doe, 106 Mich. App. 170-72, 307 N.W.2d at 439.
51. MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 710.54, 710.69 (West Supp. 1986).
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cluded from having a child through a surrogate process but was foreclosed "from paying consideration in conjunction with their use of the
state's adoption procedures." 5

In the highly publicized case of In re Baby M, the Chancery Court
of New Jersey held that a properly executed surrogate contract was
valid and enforceable against a surrogate mother who refused to give

the biological father his child after she was born.53 The court held that
the contract between these parties was neither unconscionable nor illusory. The parties were held to be of equal bargaining position, and both
had what the other wanted. 54 The court went on to state that not only
was the contract valid and enforceable, but also that enforcement could
be obtained through specific relief. Such enforcement, however, would
only be available after conception. 5 The rationale behind this holding

was that "[a] person who has promised is entitled to rely on the commitant promise of the other promiser, [and] [t]o wait for birth, to plan,
pray and dream of the joy it will bring and then be told that the child
58
will not come home . . . deeply offends the conscience of the court."
While both the Michigan court of appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court have determined that surrogate motherhood is permissible, 57 the courts came to opposite conclusions on the issue of whether
payment to the surrogate is legal. 58 Thus, what precedent does exist in

52. Doe, 106 Mich. App. 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441. In response to the plaintiff's argument that they were afforded a constitutional right to privacy, under which they have the fundamental right to decide whether or not to beget a child, the court stated: "While the decision to
bear or beget a child has thus been found to be a fundamental interest protected by the right of
privacy . . . we do not view this right as a valid prohibition to state interference in the plaintiff's
contractual arrangement." Id. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
It is this statement by the Michigan Appeals Court which demonstrates the fallacy of its
reasoning. The court recognized that the plaintiffs possessed a fundamental right to bear children,
id.; however, the court applies an improper standard for resolving conflicts between a fundamental
right of an individual and a state statute. The court stated that the fundamental right was not a
valid prohibition against state interference, but failed to show that the state had a compelling
interest in interfering with the plaintiff's fundamental right. Id. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Harper v.Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
53. In re Baby M., No. FM-25314-86E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 31, 1987).
54. The natural father had the money that the surrogate wanted and she had the ability to
perform the services of surrogacy which is what the father wanted.
55. In re Baby M., slip op. at -.
56. Id. It must be noted that prior to conception the surrogate is still free to discontinue the
artificial inseminations there by breaching the contract; however, such a breach would not be
remedied by specific performance because a remedy of damages would adequately compensate the
father, at that time, who then could continue his search.
57. Surrogate Parenting, 704 S.W.2d 207; Doe, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438.
58. The Surrogate Parenting court based its decision that payment was legal on the fundamental right to bear or begeta child, supra text accompanying notes 44-49 while the Michigan
court flatly rejected that reasoning for taking surrogate motherhood out of the purview of the
baby-bartering business, supra text accompanying note 51-52.
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regard to surrogate motherhood contracts is contradictory
inconclusive.

and

D. State of the Law in Ohio

Authoritative sources in Ohio specifically dealing with the issue of
surrogate motherhood are scarce, and what little does exist is probably

a result of the brief existence of the Association for Surrogate
Parenting. 9
In 1983 upon the request of the Ohio Department of Public Wel-

fare, the Ohio Attorney General issued an opinion

°

regarding the le-

gality of the practices of a surrogate parenting service under section
5103.17 of the Ohio Revised Code.6 ' The Attorney General ruled that

an organization, not licensed by the State of Ohio was prohibited from
engaging in the private placement of children such as "might be characterized as brokering for the services of 'surrogate' mothers"6 by section 5103.17.6a The Attorney General's opinion was based on the statu-

tory requirement that such an agency be licensed with the state in
order for the agency to legally arrange a surrogate contract.64 The
opinion's narrow scope and the Attorney General's failure to take the

59. The Association for Surrogate Parenting Services, Inc. was founded in Columbus, Ohio
by Katheryn Wyckoff in 1982. However, the center was closed in 1984 and Ms. Wyckoff returned
to California where she now runs a small surrogate service which is operated exclusively for married couples who have a medical need for a surrogate mother. Telephone interview with Katheryn
Wyckoff, owner of the Association for Surrogate Parenting, Carona Del Mar, Cal. (Sept. 9,
1986).
60. 83 Op. Ohio Atty. Gen. 001 at 2-1 (1983).
61. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.17 (Anderson Supp. 1987) provides that
no persons, associations, or institutions that have not been certified by the division of social
administration of the department of human sevices for the placement of children for adoptions or in foster homes shall advertise that they will adopt children or place them in foster
homes, hold out inducements to parents to part with their offspring, or in any manner
knowingly become party to the seperation of a child from its parents or guardians, except
through a juvenile court or probate court commitment.
Id.
62. 83 Op. Ohio Atty. Gen. 001 at 2-1 (1983).
63. Id. at 2-4.
64. Id. The Ohio Attorney General specifically concluded that
the Department of Public Welfare may reasonably conclude that a person or organization
not licensed by the department as a child-placing agency pursuant to R.C. 5103.03 is prohibited by R.C. 5103.17 from engaging in any of the following activities:
I. solicitation of women to become artificially inseminated with the sperm of men who
remain anonymous to them for the purpose of the women bearing children and surrendering possession of the children and all parental rights to such men and their spouses;
2. the negotiation, for a fee, of a contract between such men and women for the purpose of the women bearing children and surrendering possession of the children and all
parental rights to such men and their spouses; and
3. the arrangement for payment of the women involved in these transactions.
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opportunity to pass upon the legality of a surrogate contract arranged
between individuals or through a state licensed agency, suggests that
such an arrangement might be legal.6
The Ohio legislature has recently amended section 3111 of the
Ohio Revised Code to specifically provide for Artificial Insemination by
Donor (AID). 66 This law provides for an irrebuttable presumption of
paternity by the husband who consents to the artificial insemination of
his wife with a donor's sperm. 67 The significance of this statute is that
it provides the child, who was conceived through artificial insemination,
with legitimacy, and it protects the family from the donor's claim of
paternity. 68 However, the legislation specifically notes that "[tihese sections do not deal with the artificial insemination of a wife with the
9
semen of her husband or with surrogate motherhood."6 This distinction is crucial to the evolution of law governing surrogate motherhood
in Ohio because in its absence, the statute would imply that the surrogate's husband is irrebuttably the father of the child rather than the
man who contracted with the surrogate for conception of his child.
With the statute's express inapplicability, it may be concluded that the
donor of the sperm is the legitimate father in a surrogate mother
situation.
With this legal framework in mind, this comment will discuss the
validity of a surrogate contract under existing Ohio law within the context of an action by the biological father against the surrogate mother
when she breaches the contract by failing to terminate her parental
rights to the child.
III.
A.

A

HYPOTHETICAL CASE UNDER OHIO LAW

The Contract and Ohio's Adoption Laws

This discussion of the effect of Ohio law on a surrogate contract
70
will be in the context of those issues raised in In re Baby M. William
Stern, whose wife is functionally infertile, entered into a contract with
Mary Beth Whitehead whereby Whitehead was artificially inseminated
with the sperm of Stern, became pregnant, and carried the fetus until
65. Id. at 2-3. The Attorney General specifically stated that a violation of "R.C. 5103.17
may be found for a third person who acts to accomplish the separation of a child from the child's
mother even though such child would be surrendered to the natural father." Id. (emphasis added.)
The Attorney General did not say that such a violation would occur if the contract were arranged
by individuals or a state licensed agency. See also Katz, supra note 8, at 36, 37.
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
67. Id. at § 3111.37(A).
68. See Comment, Legislative Guidelines to Govern In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 495 (1986).

69.

OHio

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 3111.31 [emphasis added].
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 31, 1987).

70. In re Baby M., No. FM-25314-86E (N.J.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/5
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delivery.7 1 She agreed that she would give custody to Stern, the biologi-

cal father, and institute proceedings to terminate her parental rights to
the child. In consideration for her services, Whitehead was to be paid
$10,000 upon the completion of the contract. 7' After the birth of Baby

M., paternity tests proved that Stern was the biological father; how-

ever, in breach of her contract, Whitehead refused to surrender custody

of the baby and terminate her parental rights.74 Stern instituted an action requesting specific performance of the contract, permanent custody

of the child, and termination of the parental rights of Mary Beth
Whitehead.7 5

Assuming that Ohio law controlled the resolution of the dispute in
In re Baby M the dispositive issue in determining the rights of the parties would be whether or not the surrogate contract is valid.

6

The first

question regarding its validity under Ohio law is whether the contract
is legal in light of Ohio's adoption laws. Under section 3107.10(B) of
the Ohio Revised Code a petitioner for adoption may not pay for any
expenses incurred by the natural mother in connection with her preg-

nancy and childbirth except as specifically provided by statute. At
first blush, this statute would seem to prohibit payment to Whitehead
for her services beyond the cost of medical expenses. 78 However, this
should not be the case.

Ohio's adoption laws, making payment for adoption illegal, are in-

71. Id. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1 3, In re Baby M., No. FM-25314-86E, slip op. at I (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 31, 1987).
72. In re Baby M., slip op. at I.
73. See supra, note 13, at V 4(A).
74. Plaintiff's Complaint at 6, In re Baby M., slip op. at 1.
75. Id.
76. The court in In re Baby M., recognized that its scope of judgment was not to determine
the moral or theological ramifications of surrogate motherhood. On the contrary, the court was
determined to decide the case on legal principles alone. In re Baby M., slip op. at 1.
77. Payment for only the following items only is permitted:
(I) Physician expenses incurred in connection with prenatal care and confinement or
in connection with the birth of the minor to be adopted;
(2) Hospital expenses incurred in connection with the birth of the minor to be
adopted;
(3) Attorneys fees incurred in providing legal services in connection with the placement of the minor to be adopted or in connection with legal services provided to initiate
and pursue the adoption proceedings;
(4) Agency expenses incurred for providing services in connection with the adoption or
in connection with placement services provided by an agency under section 5103.16 of the
Revised Code;
(5) Temporary costs of routine maintenance and medical care for a minor required
under section 5103.16 of the Revised Code if the person seeking to adopt the minor refuses
to accept placement of the minor.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
78. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 247-52.
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applicable to the surrogate contract for three reasons. First, the parties
to a basic surrogate contract 79 are the biological father, the surrogate
mother, and her husband.8 0 The biological father may assert his rights
to the parent-child relationship s ' in accordance with section 3111.02 of
the Revised Code which provides that "[tihe parent and child relationship between a child and the natural father of the child may be estab2
lished pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code.""
Thus, the father proves paternity through judicial hearings which are
entirely unrelated to adoption proceedings.
Second, it has been argued that the purpose of the surrogate con3
tract is the ultimate adoption of the child by the natural father's wife."
However, this suggestion appears to expand the contract beyond its
original scope, which was to have the surrogate conceive and bear a
child for the natural father. Moreover, the wife of the biological father
is not a party to the surrogate contract and plays no role in the surrogate process.8 " Be that as it may, such an underlying purpose would
still not make the contract illegal under Ohio's adoption statutes because section 3107.10(E) of the Ohio Revised Code specifically states
that the restrictions against payment in adoption proceedings does not
apply to adoptions "by a stepparent whose spouse is biological or adoptive parent of the minor." 6
Third, rather than characterizing the payment to the surrogate as
a disbursement "in connection with the placement or adoption of a minor," 8 6 it is more consistent with the terms of the contract to classify
the payment to the surrogate as payment for her services of nine
months of pregnancy. 7 The surrogate's services and the contract terms
providing for payment to her upon her completion of obligations under
the agreement,8 8 are consistent with payment provisions of more traditional personal service contracts.

79. See, e.g., supra note 13.
80. It is advisable to include the surrogate's husband as a party to the contract so that the
presumption of the husband's paternity under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03 (Anderson Supp.
1986) cannot be used to block the operation of the contract. See Brophy, supra note !1,at
267-68.
81. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 (Anderson Supp. 1986), provides:
'[Plarent and child relationship means the legal relationship' that exists between a child and the
child's natural or adoptive parents and upon which those sections and any other provision of the
Revised Code confer or impose rights, privileges, duties, and obligations." Id.
82. Id. § 3111.02 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
83. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 250.
84. See id. at 266-67; see also supra note 13.
85. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10(F) (Anderson 1986).

86.

Id. § 3107.10(B).

87.
88.

See supra note 13.
Id.
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Public Policy

Assuming that the contract withstands attack by Ohio's adoption
laws, it may still be void if it violates public policy against the buying
and selling of babies.8" While, strong public policy exists against adoption agreements made before the birth of a child, 90 the reasons behind
such a public policy simply do not exist in a surrogate arrangement. 9
These baby-barter laws were enacted in order to prohibit selling babies
on the black market.92 Black market adoptions severely hinder the
state's efforts to ensure that an unwanted baby is placed in the best
possible home." Generally, this type of baby selling occurs in the case
of a child who is the product of an unwanted pregnancy. Mothers in
this situation can be prime targets for the black market.9
The surrogate arrangement is entirely different from the previous
scenario. In the surrogate arrangement, the pregnancy is wanted by all
parties. The surrogate, is aprised of the emotional and physical implications, agrees to become pregnant, and agrees to give the child to the
natural father.95
The surrogate is not motivated by desperation to give the child to
its father, rather, her reasons for agreeing to such an arrangement are
to provide the couple with a child that is biologically related to the
father, and to receive money.96 Typically, the parties to a surrogate
contract enter into it with great joy and expectation. The surrogate has
had the opportunity to take advice and consider her actions when she is
not yet pregnant. The surrogate consciously chose to bear a child for
another couple with the understanding that she will not contest, but
will consent to their adoption of it. Moreover, the surrogate is signifi-

89. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (mother's consent necessary for adoption),
id. § 3107.08(A) (consent to adopt may not be given until 72 hours after birth), id. § 3107.09
(consent for adoption may be withdrawn prior to adoption decree).
These particular statutes are not applicable to surrogate mothes because in the surrogate
contract there is no agreement to adopt and no such agreement is necessary. See supra notes
79-87 and accompanying text. However, these statutes clearly reflect the public policy against the
coercive nature of black market baby selling.
90. Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 75 N.Y.S.2d 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
91. For an exhaustive discussion on the public policy considerations for baby barter laws as
applied to surrogate motherhood, see Katz, supra note 8.
92. See id. at 21-22.
93. Id.
94 Id.
95. See supra note 15. The court in In re Baby M., specifically held that "informed consent" was a non-issue in a controversey over which a contract controls. The enforceability of personal service contracts cannot be held "in limbo" until the results of the intended agreement is
available so that the makers can then conclude whether the result is what was intended. In re
Baby M., No. FM-25314-86E, (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. March 31, 1987).
96. See Katz, supra note 8, at 21.
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cantly more assured that the child will have a good home. It was the
strong desire of the natural father and his wife to have a child for
which they could love and care that initiated the entire process. Accordingly, absent legislative intent to the contrary, invalidation of a
surrogate contract as against public policy would be misplaced.
The Ohio legislature has made its intent clear concerning Artificial
Insemination by Donor (AID)9 by providing the husband, who has no
biological relationship to the child conceived through the artificial insemination of his wife, with an irrebuttable presumption of paternity."
In so doing, the legislature has not only relegated the sperm donor to
being merely a tool through which a couple may have a child of their
own, but also precluded the donor from making any claim to a parent9
child relationship with the child conceived by AID. Just as the donor's sperm is an indisposable concomittant to the conception of a child
biologically related to the wife of an infertile man, so too is the egg and
uterus of a surrogate mother a necessary conduit through which the
husband of an infertile woman may have a child biologically related to
himself. In the reproductive context, the donor's sperm is just as neces100
sary as the surrogate's egg and uterus. The donor is paid for donat10 1
ing his sperm just as the surrogate is paid for carrying the child.
Therefore, it may be entirely consistent with the purposes of the AID
legislation to treat surrogate mothers in the same manner that the statutes treat the sperm donor. As a result, the surrogate contract should
be held valid under existing Ohio law.
C.

The Remedies for Breach

Once a contract is deemed to be valid and enforceable, the next
question is to determine the method of enforcement and the available
remedies. The issue arises whether the contract should be specifically
enforced or whether the father should only receive monetary damages.
A monetary damage award in favor of the aggrieved father will
not truly compensate him for his loss. Even if the father could prove
economic injury, beyond that of the fee already paid, a monetary
award would not fully compensate him because the child he seeks is

97. The Ohio Revised Code defines AID stating that artificial insemination is "the introduction of semen into the vagina, cervical canal, or uterus through instruments or other artificial
means," OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.30(A) (Anderson Supp. 1986), and a donor is "a man
who supplies semen for non-spousal artificial insemination." Id. § 3111.30(B).
98. Id. §§ 3111.03(B), 3111.37(A).
99. Id.
100. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 212 n.3 (Ky. 1986) (see
supra note 44).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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unique."'2 Merely allowing him to recover out-of-pocket expenses cannot adequately address the magnitude of the harm because there is no
ethically acceptable way to determine the worth of a child.' 0 3 Additionally, the whole purpose of the contract was to give the natural father a
child of his own,"0 4 and he was willing to pay a significant amount of
money to do so. Thus, merely affording him restitution in no way compensates him for his emotional distress and the frustration of his parental aspirations. 0 "
Because monetary damages seem entirely inappropriate in light of
the unique personal expectations of the natural father and his wife, the
alternative would be specific performance of the surrogate contract. 0 6
As a general rule, courts are reluctant to grant specific performance of
contracts for personal service, 0 7 and even where the contract is legal, a
court may refuse specific enforcement if enforcement would be unconscionable. 0 8 It has been argued that at the time of birth, the surrogate
mother has developed not only a physical attachment to the child but
also an emotional attachment to the child which is much more intense
than any attachments or expectations of the natural father and his
wife. 10 9 As a result, the argument concludes, even though refusing to
grant specific performance would leave the natural father without an
appropriate remedy, "the balance of the equities should favor the natural mother."' 110
On the other hand, it has been argued that the remedy of specific
performance is "a conscious attempt on the part of [a] court to do complete justice to both the parties with respect to all the judicial relations
growing out of the contract between them.""' Specific performance is
available when monetary damages are not adequate to put the aggrieved party in a position as beneficial to him as if the agreement were
specifically performed." 2 In a situation where the surrogate refuses to
give the child to the natural father, no amount of money can ade-

102. See Black, supra note 12, at 393.
103. Comment, SurrogateMothers: The Legal Issues, 7 Am. J.L. & Med. 323, 338 (1981).
104. Id. at 337-38.
105. See Black, supra note 8, at 393.
106. One author has argued staunchly against specific enforcement of a surrogate contract
breached by the surrogate mother. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 259-64.
107. See generally RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1979).
108. Rosenberg v. Callam, 37 Abs. 9, 55 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
109. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 260-62.
110. Id. at 260.
III. 4. J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §1401 5th ed. 1941), quoted
in Hotel Burnet Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 72 Ohio App. 453, 456, 52 N.E.2d 754, 756
(1943).
112. See State v. Backhaus, 56 Ohio App. 2d 79, 381 N.E.2d 646 (1977); Hotel Burnet
Co., 72 Ohio App. 453, 52 N.E.2d at 754.
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quately compensate him for his shattered expectations of having a child
of his own. Additionally requiring the surrogate to fulfill her contractual obligations is not unfair." 3 She agreed to become a surrogate only
after she underwent extensive consideration including legal, medical,
and psychological counseling, and she was aprised of the ramifications
1
of her service to both herself and the natural father. ' The surrogate
entered the contract expecting to be paid for her services while the natural father entered it to have a child of his own. Accordingly, the surrogate's expectations are fulfilled by payment of her fee while the natural father can only be made whole through specific performance of the
contract, giving him custody of the child."'
Many of the proposed bills which would regulate surrogate arrangements provide that in the event of a breach, specific performance
1
would be an available remedy to the aggrieved party." " However, because specific performance of a contract "rests in the sound legal dis''
cretion of the court, in view of all the circumstances of the case,"
unless there is a legislative imperative that the contract must be specifically enforced, the courts will determine the remedy for such a breach
on an ad hoc basis, in accordance with equitable principles.
D. Implication of Upholding Surrogate Contracts
The implications of a determination that a surrogate contract is
valid and enforceable under Ohio law are significant. The first implica-.
tion is that Ohio may become the subject of forum shopping. Couples
desiring a child through a surrogate process may choose to consummate
an agreement' 8 in Ohio since its law forbidding payment for adoption
19
does not apply when the child is being adopted by a stepparent.
Second, Ohio law, as compared with the current status of the laws
in most states, 2 0 may provide more certainty to those parties wishing
to enter a surrogate contract. This is due to the following factors: 1) In
Ohio the surrogate contract is not void as illegal because Ohio's adop113. See Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family". A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1310-16 (1985).
114. Id. at 1312-13; see also supra note 9.
115. See Note, supra note 18, at 1313.
116. "'Upon a breach of a surrogate parenthood contract, a court may grant any legal and
equitable relief it deems appropriate including specific performance." N.J. 5481 § 14 (1983) (reintroduced as N.J. S767 (1986)). "[Tlhe parties shall have available all legal and equitable remedies, including specific performance, in the event of a breach of the surrogate parenthood contract,
notwithstanding any contrary provision of law." Note, supra note 113, at 1310.
117. Huntington v. Rogers, 9 Ohio St. 511, 515 (1859).
118. See Sherman, The Baby M Example: Getting Around Baby Selling Laws, N.J.L.J.
Sept. 11, 1986, at 3, col. I.
119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10(E) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
120. See Katz, supra note 8, at 25-53.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/5

1987]

COMMENT

tion laws are expressly inapplicable to surrogate motherhood;' and 2)
the surrogate contract is not void as against public policy prohibiting
baby-bartering. 22 Courts would be hard pressed to find that the legislature intended for baby-bartering policies to apply to surrogate arrangements. These laws and policies were adopted long before the modern practice of surrogate motherhood existed, and if legislative intent
can be found anywhere it is in the laws regulating AID-the male
counterpart to surrogate motherhood-thus making the practice comply with public policy.

The final implication of a determination that a surrogate contract

is valid and enforceable under existing Ohio law is that the permissibility of such contracts gives the green light to medical science to continue to find viable options for infertile couples who wish to have a
child. Moreover, it provides the assurance that the law is willing to
evolve in new directions to accommodate technological advances while
continuing to firmly support the policies and purposes for which it was
designed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is necessary for any court deciding a controversey arising out of
a surrogate arrangement to recognize that, despite what appears to be
a volitile debate, it is one that must be decided on legal and equitable
principles rather than the moral and ethical questions it raises. This
comment has set forth a methodology which is designed to do precisely
that.
Valerie Wilt

121. See supra text accompanying notes 78-89.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 88-97.
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APPENDIX
SURROGATE PARENTING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made this 6th day of February, 1985, by
and between MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, a married woman (herein
referred to as "Surrogate["]), RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband (herein referred to a[s] "Husband"), and WILLIAM STERN,
(herein referred to as "Natural Father").
RECITALS
THIS AGREEMENT is made with reference to the following
facts:(1)
WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, is an individual over the
age of eighteen (18) years who is desirous of entering into this
Agreement.
(2) The sole purpose of this Agreement is to enable WILLIAM
STERN and his infertile wife to have a child which is biologically related to WILLIAM STERN.
(3) MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD
WHITEHEAD, her husband, are over the age of eighteen (18) years
and desirous of entering into this Agreement in consideration of the
following:
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
contained herein and the intentions of being legally bound hereby, the
parties agree as follows:
[1. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, warrants that] she
is capable of conceiving children. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD understands and agrees that in the best interest of the child, she will not
form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with any child or
children she may conceive, carry to term and give birth to, pursuant to
the provisions of this Agreement, and shall freely surrender custody to
WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, immediately upon birth of the
child; and terminate all parental rights to said child pursuant to this
Agreement.
2. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD
WHITEHEAD, her husband, have been married since 12/2/73, and
RICHARD WHITEHEAD is in agreement with the purposes, intents
and provisions of this Agreement and acknowledges that his wife,
MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, shall be artificially inseminated pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement. RICHARD
WHITEHEAD agrees that in the best interest of the child, he will not
form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with any child or
children MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, may conceive by
artificial insemination as described herein, and agrees to freely and
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readily surrender immediate custody of the child to WILLIAM
STERN, Natural Father; and terminate his parental rights; RICHARD WHITEHEAD further acknowledges he will do all acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity of any offspring conceived
and born pursuant to aforementioned agreement as provided by law,
including blood testing and/or HLA testing.
3. WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, does hereby enter into
this written contractual Agreement with MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, where MARY BETH WHITEHEAD shall be artificially inseminated with the semen of WILLIAM STERN by a physician. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, upon becoming
pregnant, acknowledges that she will carry said embryo/fetus(s) [sic]
until delivery. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband, agree that they will cooperate with
any background investigation into the Surrogate's medical, family and
personal history and warrants the information to be accurate to the
best of their knowledge. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate,
and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband, agree to surrender custody of the child to WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, immediately
upon birth, acknowledging that it is the intent of this Agreement in the
best interests of the child to do so; as well as institute and cooperate in
proceedings to terminate their respective parental rights to said child,
and sign any and all necessary affidavits, documents, and the like, in
order to further the intent and purposes of this Agreement. It is understood by MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, that the child to be conceived is being done so for the sole
purpose of giving said child to WILLIAM STERN, its natural and
biological father. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD and RICHARD
WHITEHEAD agree to sign all necessary affidavits prior to and after
the birth of the child and voluntarily participate in any paternity proceedings necessary to have WILLIAM STERN's name entered on said
child's birth certificate as the natural or biological father.
4. That the consideration for this Agreement, which is compensation for services and expenses, and in no way is to be construed as a fee
for termination of parental rights or a payment in exchange for a consent to surrender the child for adoption, in addition to other provisions
contained herein, shall be as follows:(A) $10,000 shall be paid to
MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, upon surrender of custody
to WILLIAM STERN, the natural and biological father of the child
born pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement for surrogate services
and expenses in carrying out her obligations under this Agreement;
(B) The consideration to be paid to MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, shall be deposited with the Infertility Center of
Published by eCommons, 1986
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New York (hereinafter ICNY), the representative of WILLIAM
STERN, at the time of the signing of this Agreement, and held in
escrow until completion of the duties and obligations of MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, (see Exhibit "A" for a copy of the Escrow
Agreement), as herein described.
(C) WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, shall pay the expenses
incurred by MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, pursuant to her
pregnancy, more specifically defined as follows:
(1) All medical, hospitalization, and pharmaceutical, laboratory
and therapy expenses incurred as a result of MARY BETH WHITEHEAD's pregnancy, not covered or allowed by her present health and
major medical insurance, including all extraordinary medical expenses
and all reasonable expenses for treatment of any emotional or mental
conditions or problems related to said pregnancy, but in no case shall
any such expenses be paid or reimbursed after a period of six (6)
months have elapsed since the date of the termination of the pregnancy, and this Agreement specifically excludes any expenses for lost
wages"or other non-itemized incidentals (see Exhibit "B") related to
said pregnancy.
(2) WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, shall not be responsible
for any latent medical expenses occurring six (6) weeks subsequent to
the birth of the child, unless the medical problem or abnormality incident thereto was known and treated by a physician prior to the expiration of said six (6) week period and in written notice of the same sent
to ICNY, as representative of WILLIAM STERN by certified mail,
return receipt requested, advising of this treatment.
(3) WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, shall be responsible for
the total costs of all paternity testing. Such paternity testing may, at
the option of WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, be required prior to
release of the surrogate fee from escrow. In the event WILLIAM
STERN, Natural Father, is conclusively determined not to be the biological father of the child as a result of an HLA test, this Agreement
will be deemed breached and MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, shall not be entitled to any fee. WILLIAM STERN, Natural
Father, shall be entitled to reimbursement of all medical and related
expenses from MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband.
(4) MARY BETH WHITEHEAD'S reasonable travel expenses
incurred at the request' of WILLIAM STERN, pursuant to this
Agreement.
5. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD
WHITEHEAD, her husband, understand and agree to assume all risks,
including the risk of death, which are incidental to conception, preghttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss3/5
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nancy, childbirth, including but not limited to, postpartum complications. A copy of said possible risks and/or complications is attached
hereto and made a part hereof (see Exhibit "C").
6. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD
WHITEHEAD, her husband, hereby agree to undergo psychiatric
evaluation by JOAN EINWOHNER, a psychiatrist as designated by
WILLIAM STERN or an agent thereof. WILLIAM STERN shall
pay for the cost of said psychiatric evaluation. MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD and RICHARD WHITEHEAD shall sign, prior to
their evaluations, a medical release permitting dissemination of the report prepared as a result of said psychiatric evaluations to ICNY or
WILLIAM STERN and his wife.
7. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD
WHITEHEAD, her husband, hereby agree that it is the exclusive and
sole right of WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, to name said child.
8. "Child" as referred to in this Agreement shall include all children born simultaneously pursuant to the inseminations contemplated
herein.
9. In the event of the death of WILLIAM STERN, prior or subsequent to the birth [of the child, it is agreed by MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD,] Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband, that the child will be placed in the custody of WILLIAM
STERN'S WIFE.
10. In the event that the child is miscarried prior to the fifth (5th)
month of pregnancy, no compensation, as enumerated in paragraph
4(A), shall be paid to MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate. However, the expenses enumerated in paragraph 4(C) shall be paid or reimbursed to MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate. In the event the
child is miscarried, dies or is stillborn subsequent to the fourth (4th)
month of pregnancy and said child does not survive, the Surrogate shall
receive $1,000.00 in lieu of the compensation enumerated in paragraph
4(A). In the event of a miscarriage or stillbirth as described above, this
Agreement shall terminate and neither MARY BETH WHITEHEAD,
Surrogate, nor WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, shall be under
any further obligation under this Agreement.
11. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and WILLIAM
STERN, Natural Father, shall have undergone complete physical and
genetic evaluation, under the direction and supervision of a licensed
physician, to determine whether the physical health and well-being of
each is satisfactory. Said physical examination shall include testing for
venereal diseases, specifically including but not limited to, syphilis,
herpes and gonorrhea. Said venereal disease testing shall be done prior
to, but not limited to, each series of inseminations.
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12. In the event that pregnancy has not occurred within a reasonable time, in the opinion of WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, this
Agreement shall terminate by written notice to MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, at the residence provided to the ICNY by
the Surrogate, from ICNY, as representative of WILLIAM STERN,
Natural Father.
13. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, agrees that she will
not abort the child once [ . .] except, if in the professional medical
opinion of the inseminating physician, such [. .] is necessary for the
physical health of MARY BETH WHITEHEAD or the child has been
determined by said physician to be physiologically abnormal. MARY
BETH WHITEHEAD further agrees, upon the request of said physician to undergo amniocentesis (see Exhibit "D") or similar tests to detect genetic and congenital defects. In the event said test reveals that
the fetus is genetically or congenitally abnormal, MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, agrees to abort the fetus upon demand of
WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, in which event, the fee paid to
the Surrogate will be in accordance to Paragraph 10. If MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD refuses to abort the fetus upon demand of WILLIAM
STERN, his obligations as stated in this Agreement shall cease forthwith, except as to obligations of paternity imposed by statute.
14. Despite the provisions of Paragraph 13, WILLIAM STERN,
Natural Father, recognizes that some genetic and congenital abnormalities may not be detected by amniocentesis or other tests, and therefore,
if proven to be the biological father of the child, assumes the legal responsibility for any child who may possess genetic or congenital abnormalities. (See Exhibits "E" and "F").
15. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, further agrees to
adhere to all medical instructions given to her by the inseminating physician as well as her independent obstetrician. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD also agrees not to smoke cigarettes, drink alcoholic beverages,
use illegal drugs, or take non-prescription medications or prescribed
medications without written consent from her physician. MARY
BETH WHITEHEAD agrees to follow a prenatal medical examination
schedule to consist of no fewer visits than: one visit per month during
the first seven (7) months of pregnancy, two visits (each to occur at
two-week intervals) during the eighth and ninth month[s] [sic] of
pregnancy.
16. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, agrees to cause
RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband to execute a refusal of consent form as annexed hereto as Exhibit "G".
17. Each party acknowledges that he or she fully understands this
Agreement and its legal effect, and that they are signing the same
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freely and voluntarily and that neither party has any reason to believe
that the other(s) did not freely and voluntarily execute said Agreement.
18. In the event any of the provisions of this Agreement are
deemed to be invalid or unenforceable, the same shall be deemed severable from the remainder of this Agreement and shall not cause the
invalidity or unenforceability of the remainder of this Agreement. If
such provision shall be deemed invalid due to its scope or breadth, then
said provision shall be deemed valid to the extent of the scope or
breadth permitted by law.
19. The original of this Agreement, upon execution, shall be retained by the Infertility Center of New York, with photocopies being
distributed to MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, having the same legal effect as the
original.
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